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Abstract
We show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a mixed
version of the Shapley window model, where large traders are repre-
sented as atoms and small traders are represented by an atomless part.
Previous existence theorems for the Shapley window model, provided
by Sahi and Yao (1989) in the case of economies with a nite number
of traders and by Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) in the case
of mixed exchange economies, are essentially based on the assumption
that there are at least two atoms with strictly positive endowments
and indierence curves contained in the strict interior of the commod-
ity space. Our result does not require this restriction. It relies on the
characteristics of the atomless part of the economy and exploits the
fact that traders belonging to the atomless part have an endogenous
\Walrasian" behavior.
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1 Introduction
Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) proved the existence of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for the Shapley window model in mixed exchange economies
a la Shitovitz, i.e., in exchange economies with large traders, represented as
atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part (see Shitovitz
(1973)).1 The Shapley window model belongs to a very fruitful line of re-
search on noncooperative market games, initiated by Lloyd S. Shapley and
Martin Shubik (for a survey of this literature, see Giraud (2003)). It was
proposed informally by Shapley and subsequently formalized by Sahi and
Yao (1989) in the case of exchange economies with a nite number of traders.
For this case, they proved the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Codognato and Ghosal (2000) studied the Shapley window model in the
case of exchange economies with an atomless continuum of traders and they
proved an equivalence theorem a la Aumann between the set of Cournot-
Nash and Walras allocations (see Aumann (1964)).2 This result, together
with the existence theorem of a Walras equilibrium in markets with a contin-
uum of traders proved in Aumann (1966), implies the existence of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium also in this limit framework.
The proof provided by Busetto et al. (2011) for the mixed market case
is based on the same assumptions as the proof provided by Sahi and Yao
(1989) for the nite case. In particular, it requires that there are at least
two atoms with strictly positive endowments, continuously dierentiable
utility functions, and indierence curves contained in the strict interior of
the commodity space. These restrictions are stated by Busetto et al. (2011)
in their Assumption 4.
Codognato and Julien (2013) replaced this assumption on atoms' endow-
ments and preferences with a dierent restriction requiring that the atomless
part holds, in the aggregate, each commodity and that preferences of the
traders belonging to the atomless part are represented by Cobb-Douglas
utility functions. Under these assumptions, they showed the existence of
1Mixed exchange economies were systematically analyzed, in the line opened by Shi-
tovitz (1973), using the core as a solution concept (for a survey of this literature, see
Gabszewicz and Shitovitz (1992)). Nevertheless, the idea of mixing large players and
small players in a game theoretical framework was rst introduced by John W. Milnor
and Lloyd S. Shapley in two Rand research memoranda written in the early 1960s, then
merged into a single article by Milnor and Shapley (1978).
2Codognato and Ghosal (2000) actually extended to the Shapley window model some
results connecting Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations in strategic market games with
an atomless continuum of traders previously proved by Dubey and Shapley (1994).
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a Cobb-Douglas-Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the Shapley window model,
i.e., a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where the strategies of the traders belong-
ing to the atomless part depend on the parameters of their Cobb-Douglas
utility functions.
In this paper, we develop Codognato and Julien's idea in a more gen-
eral context: Our main result consists in an existence proof for the mixed
version of the Shapley window model proposed by Busetto et al. (2011)
which is essentially based on restrictions on endowments and preferences of
the atomless part of the economy rather than of atoms. In particular, we
remove their Assumption 4 and we use the fact, proved by Codognato and
Ghosal (2000), that traders belonging to the atomless part have an endoge-
nous \Walrasian" behavior: Their best reply attains indeed a commodity
bundle which maximizes their utility subject to their budget constraint at
the prevailing market clearing prices, which they are not able to manipulate.
More precisely, we exploit this property of the atomless part's behavior
to show a preliminary price convergence theorem, under the assumption
that each commodity is held, in the aggregate, by the atomless part and
that traders' utility functions are continuous, strongly monotone, quasi-
concave, and measurable. This result establishes that any sequence of prices
corresponding to a sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibria has a subsequence
which converges to a strictly positive price vector and it has an autonomous
relevance since it can be employed to show existence theorems for mixed
exchange economies under dierent sets of assumptions, as argued in the
paper.
We use it to prove our main existence theorem under the assumption that
the set of commodities is strongly connected through traders' characteristics.
It imposes a joint restriction on the endowments and preferences of the
atomless part and is a variant of a hypothesis proposed by Codognato and
Ghosal (2000). This assumption, combined with the continuity properties
of the Walrasian correspondence generated by the atomless part's behavior,
guarantees that the aggregate matrix of the bids obtained as the limit of a
sequence of perturbed Cournot-Nash equilibria is irreducible.
Finally, we show that our price convergence theorem can be used to
prove a further existence result, which diers both from our main theorem
and the one proposed by Busetto et al. (2011). Like this latter theorem,
it requires that all commodities are held by at least two atoms and, in the
aggregate, by the atomless part but, in contrast with it, it does not require
any further condition on traders' utility functions beyond continuity, strong
monotonicity, quasi-concavity, and measurability.
3
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the math-
ematical model. In Section 3, we state and prove the general price conver-
gence theorem. In Section 4, we state and prove our main existence theorem.
In Section 5, we discuss the model and we provide a further existence theo-
rem. In Section 6, we draw some conclusions from our analysis.
2 The mathematical model
We consider an exchange economy with large traders, represented as atoms,
and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of traders
is denoted by the measure space (T; T ; ), where T is the set of traders, T
is the -algebra of all -measurable subsets of T , and  is a real valued,
non-negative, countably additive measure dened on T . We assume that
(T; T ; ) is nite, i.e., (T ) < +1. This implies that the measure space
(T; T ; ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T1 denote the set of
atoms and T0 = T n T1 the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set
of measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the
paper. Thus, a statement asserted for \each" trader in a certain set is to
be understood to hold for all such traders except possibly for a null set of
traders. The word \integrable" is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are l dierent commodities. A com-
modity bundle is a point in Rl+. An assignment (of commodity bundles
to traders) is an integrable function x: T ! Rl+. There is a xed initial
assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for each t 2 T , RT0 w(t) d 0.
An allocation is an assignment x for which
R
T x(t) d =
R
T w(t) d.
The preferences of each trader t 2 T are described by a utility function
ut : R
l
+ ! R, satisfying the following assumptions.
Assumption 2. ut : R
l
+ ! R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasi-
concave, for each t 2 T .
Let B denote the Borel -algebra of Rl+. Moreover, let T
NB denote
the -algebra generated by all the sets E  F such that E 2 T and F 2 B.
Assumption 3. u : T  Rl+ ! R, given by u(t; x) = ut(x), for each t 2 T
and for each x 2 Rl+, is T
NB-measurable.
We nally impose an assumption on endowments and preferences of the
atomless part, which is a reformulation of a hypothesis introduced by Codog-
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nato and Ghosal (2000). It requires that the set of commodities is strongly
connected through traders' characteristics.3 In order to formalize this fea-
ture, we need some preliminary denitions: We denote by L the set of com-
modities f1; : : : ; lg. We say that two commodities i; j 2 L stand in relation
C if there is a measurable set T i, with (T i) > 0, such that T i = ft 2 T0 :
wi(t) > 0; wr(t) = 0; for each r 2 Lnfigg, ut() is dierentiable, additively
separable in commodity j, i.e., ut(x) = v
j
t (x
j)+vt(x
1; : : : ; xj 1; xj+1; : : : ; xl),
for each x 2 Rl+, and dv
j
t (0)
dxj
= +1, for each t 2 T i.4
Then, the concept of a set of commodities strongly connected through
traders' characteristics can be dened as follows.
Denition 1. The set of commodities L is said to be strongly connected
thorough traders' characteristics if f(i; j) : iCjg 6= ; and the directed graph
DL(L;C) is strongly connected, i.e., any ordered pair of distinct vertices, i
and j, of DL(L;C) is connected by a path.
We can now state our last assumption.
Assumption 4. The set of commodities L is strongly connected through
traders' characteristics.
A price vector is a nonnull vector p 2 Rl+. Let X0 : T0 Rl++ ! P(Rl)
be a correspondence such that, for each t 2 T0 and for each p 2 Rl++,
X0(t; p) = argmaxfu(x) : x 2 Rl+ and px  pw(t)g. It is well-known that
the previous assumptions guarantee that the correspondence X0(t; ) is up-
per hemicontinuous, for each t 2 T0. For each p 2 Rl++, let
R
T0
X0(t; p) d =
fRT0 x0(t; p) d : x0(; p) is integrable and x0(t; p) 2 X0(t; p); for each t 2
T0g. Finally, let Z0 : Rl++ ! P(Rl) be a correspondence which associates
with each p 2 Rl++ the Minkowski dierence between the set
R
T0
X0(t; p) d
and the set fRT0 w(t) dg.5
We dene now the strategic market game associated with the exchange
economy described above. It is a slightly reformulated version of the Shapley
window model for mixed economies proposed by Busetto et al. (2011).
3Codognato and Ghosal (2000) used the concept of a \net" to characterize the set of
commodities in a similar way. We refer to them for further details.
4In this denition, dierentiability is to be understood as continuous dierentiability
and it includes the case of innite partial derivatives along the boundary of the consump-
tion set (for a discussion of this case, see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 58). Moreover, it
can be proved that the separable utility function used in the denition is the representation
of separable preferences (see, for instance, Kreps (2012), p. 42).
5For a discussion of the properties of the correspondences introduced above and their
proofs see, for instance, Debreu (1982), Section 4.
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Let P(Rl2+) denote the power set of Rl
2
+. A strategy correspondence is a
correspondence B : T ! P(Rl2+) such that, for each t 2 T , B(t) = f(bij) 2
Rl
2
+ :
Pl
j=1 bij  wi(t); i = 1; : : : ; lg, where bij ; i; j = 1; : : : ; l, represents the
amount of commodity i that trader t oers in exchange for commodity j.
Moreover, with some abuse of notation, we denote by b(t) 2 B(t) a strategy
of trader t. A strategy selection is an integrable function b : T ! Rl2+, such
that, for each t 2 T , b(t) 2 B(t). Given a strategy selection b, we dene
the aggregate matrix B to be the matrix such that bij = (
R
T bij(t) d),
i; j = 1; : : : ; l. Moreover, we denote by bnb(t) the strategy selection obtained
from b by replacing b(t) with b(t) 2 B(t), and by Bn b(t) the corresponding
aggregate matrix.
The following denitions are borrowed from Sahi and Yao (1989).
Denition 2. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for
every pair (i; j), with i 6= j, there is a positive integer k such that a(k)ij > 0,
where a
(k)
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A
k of A.
Denition 3. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be
market clearing if
p 2 Rl++;
lX
i=1
pibij = p
j(
lX
i=1
bji); j = 1; : : : ; l: (1)
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), there is a unique, up to a scalar
multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only if B is irreducible. Then,
we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection
b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), if B is
irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise. We can assume that prices are
normalized in such a way that p(b) 2 , where  = fp 2 Rl+ :
Pl
i=1 p
i =
1g, when p(b) 0.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment
determined as follows:
xj(t;b(t); p) = wj(t) 
lX
i=1
bji(t) +
lX
i=1
bij(t)
pi
pj
; if p 2 Rl++;
xj(t;b(t); p) = wj(t); otherwise;
j = 1; : : : ; l, for each t 2 T .
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Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders' nal
holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed
by the assignment
x(t) = x(t;b(t); p(b));
for each t 2 T .6 It is straightforward to show that this assignment is an
allocation.
We are now able to introduce a notion of Cournot-Nash equilibrium for
this reformulation of the Shapley window model (see Codognato and Ghosal
(2000) and Busetto et al. (2011)).
Denition 4. A strategy selection b^ such that
^
B is irreducible is a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium if
ut(x(t; b^(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t))));
for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T .7
Finally, we dene the notion of a perturbation of the strategic market
game (it was already used by Sahi and Yao (1989) and Busetto et al. (2011)
in their existence proofs).
Given  > 0 and a strategy selection b, we dene the aggregate matrix
B to be the matrix such that bij = (bij + ), i; j = 1; : : : ; l. Clearly, the
matrix B is irreducible. The interpretation is that an outside agency places
xed bids of  for each pair of commodities (i; j).
Given  > 0, we denote by p(b) the function which associates, with
each strategy selection b, the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector
satisfying
lX
i=1
pi(bij + ) = p
j(
lX
i=1
(bji + ); j = 1; : : : ; l: (2)
As already said, prices belong to the unit simplex.
Denition 5. Given  > 0, a strategy selection b^ is an -Cournot-Nash
equilibrium if
ut(x(t; b^
(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t))));
for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T .
6In order to save in notation, with some abuse we denote by x both the function x(t)
and the function x(t;b(t); p(b)).
7Let us notice that, as this denition of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium explicitly refers
to irreducible matrices, it applies only to active equilibria (on this point, see Sahi and Yao
(1989)).
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3 The price convergence theorem
In order to prove their existence theorem, Busetto et al. (2011) used a result,
proved as Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao (1989), which states that there exists a
constant  > 0 such that pj(b^)  , j = 1; : : : ; l, for each strategy selection
b^ with   1. By applying this result, Busetto et al. (2011) showed that
any convergent sequence of normalized prices corresponding to a sequence
of -Cournot-Nash equilibria has a convergent subsequence whose limit is a
strictly positive price vector. Sahi and Yao's Lemma 9, and consequently
Busetto et al.'s convergence result, are essentially based on the assumption
that there are at least two atoms with strictly positive endowments, con-
tinuously dierentiable utility functions, and indierence curves contained
in the strict interior of the commodity space.8 This restriction is stated by
Busetto et al. (2011) in their Assumption 4.
In this section, we provide a dierent price convergence theorem, ob-
tained by removing Busetto et al.'s Assumption 4 and focusing on restric-
tions concerning endowments and preferences of the atomless part of the
economy rather than of atoms. More precisely, we exploit the property
of small traders, proved by Codognato and Ghosal (2000), of being \Wal-
rasian" at a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Our price convergence theorem es-
tablishes that any sequence of normalized prices corresponding to a sequence
of Cournot-Nash equilibria has a convergent subsequence whose limit is a
strictly positive price vector. We use it to show our main existence theorem,
but it can be more generally employed to show other existence theorems for
mixed exchange economies where Busetto et al.'s Assumption 4 is relaxed.
We will give an example in Section 5 by means of the existence result stated
in Theorem 3.
We can now state and prove this general price convergence result.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, let fp^ng be a sequence of
normalized prices such that fp^ng = p(b^n) where b^n is a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, for each n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, there exists a subsequence fp^kng
of the sequence fp^ng which converges to a price vector p^ 0.
Proof. Let fp^ng be a sequence of normalized prices such that fp^ng = p(b^n)
where b^n is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, for each n = 1; 2; : : :. Then, there
is a subsequence fp^kng of the sequence fp^ng which converges to a price
8Formally, this assumption requires that there are at least two traders in T1 for whom
w(t) 0, ut() is continuously dierentiable in Rl++, and fx 2 Rl+ : ut(x) = ut(w(t))g 
Rl++.
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vector p^ 2  as the unit simplex  is a compact set. Suppose that p^ 2 @,
where @ denotes the boundary of the unit simplex. Following Debreu
(1982), let jxj = Pli=1 jxij, for each x 2 Rl, and let d[0; S] = infx2S jxj,
for each S  Rl. Then, the sequence fd[0;Z0(p^kn)]g diverges to +1 sinceR
T0
w(t) d  0 and p^ 2 @, as pointed out by Debreu (1982) in Property
(iv).9 Let x^n(t) = x(t; b^n(t); p(b^n)), for each t 2 T , and for each n =
1; 2; : : :. Then, x^n(t) 2 X0(t; p^n), for each t 2 T0, and for each n = 1; 2; : : :,
by the same argument used by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) to prove their
Theorem 2.10 But then, (
R
T0
x^n(t) d   RT0 w(t) d) 2 Z0(p^n), for each
n = 1; 2; : : :. We have thatZ
T0
x^n(t) d 
Z
T0
w(t) d+
Z
T1
w(t) d
as
R
T x^
n(t) d =
R
T w(t) d, for each n = 1; 2; : : :. Then,Z
T0
x^in(t) d 
Z
T0
wi(t) d
  Z
T0
wi(t) d+
Z
T1
wi(t) d
as   RT1 wi(t) d  RT0 x^in(t) d  2 RT0 wi(t) d+ RT1 wi(t) d, i = 1; : : : ; l,
for each n = 1; 2; : : :. But then,
lX
i=1
Z
T0
x^in(t) d 
Z
T0
wi(t) d
  lX
i=1
Z
T0
wi(t) d+
Z
T1
wi(t) d

;
for each n = 1; 2; : : :. Moreover, there exists an n0 such that
d[0;Z0(p^kn)] >
lX
i=1
Z
T0
wi(t) d+
Z
T1
wi(t) d

;
for each n  n0, as the sequence fd[0;Z0(p^kn)]g diverges to +1. Then,
lX
i=1
Z
T0
x^ikn(t) d 
Z
T0
wi(t) d
 > lX
i=1
Z
T0
wi(t) d+
Z
T1
wi(t) d

as
Pl
i=1 j
R
T0
x^ikn(t) d   RT0 wi(t) dj  d[0;Z0(p^kn)], for each n  n0, a
contradiction. Hence, p^ 0.
9See Debreu (1982), p. 728.
10See Codognato and Ghosal (2000), p. 49.
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4 The existence theorem
In this section, we state and prove our main existence theorem for the mixed
version of the Shapley window model, which diers from that proved by
Busetto et al. (2011) in that it replaces their Assumption 4, on endowments
and preferences of atoms, with the assumption that the set of commodities
is strongly connected through traders' characteristics, imposing restrictions
on endowments and preferences of the atomless part. Our existence result
crucially rests on the price convergence theorem proved in the previous sec-
tion.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium b^.
Proof. To show Theorem 2, we rst need to prove the existence of an
-Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The following lemma, which was proved by
Busetto et al. (2011) applying the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg theorem, states
that such an equilibrium exists.
Lemma 1. For each  > 0, there exists an -Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3 in Busetto et al. (2011).
We now show that the sequence of -Cournot-Nash equilibria has a limit
and that this limit is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Following Busetto et
al. (2011), in this part of the proof, we apply a generalization of the
Fatou's lemma in several dimensions provided by Artstein (1979). Let
n =
1
n ; n = 1; 2; : : :. By Lemma 1, there is an -Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium b^n , for each n = 1; 2; : : :. The fact that the sequence f ^Bng be-
longs to the compact set f(bij) 2 Rl2+ : bij 
R
T w
i(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; lg
and the sequence fp^ng, where p^n = pn(b^n), belongs to the unit sim-
plex , for each n = 1; 2; : : :, implies that there are a subsequence f ^Bkng
of the sequence f ^Bng which converges to an element of the set f(bij) 2
Rl
2
+ : bij 
R
T w
i(t) d; i; j = 1; : : : ; lg, and a subsequence fp^kng of the
sequence fp^ng which converges to a price vector p^ 2 , with p^  0, by
Theorem 1. Since the sequence fb^kng satises the assumptions of The-
orem A in Artstein (1979), by this theorem there is a function b^ such
that b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence fb^kn (t)g, for each t 2 T and
such that the sequence f ^Bkng converges to ^B. Moreover, p^ and ^B sat-
isfy (1), since p^kn and
^
B
kn
kn
satisfy (2), for each n = 1; 2; : : :, the sequence
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fp^kng converges to p^, the sequence f ^Bkng converges to ^B, and the se-
quence fkng converges to 0. We now show that, if two commodities i; j 2 L
stand in the relation C, then
^
bij > 0. Suppose that
^
bij = 0. Then,R
T i b^ij(t) d = 0 as (T
i) > 0. Consider a trader  2 T i. We can sup-
pose that b^ij() = 0 as we ignore null sets. Since b^() is a limit point of the
sequence fb^kn ()g, there is a subsequence fb^hkn ()g of this sequence which
converges to b^(). Let x^n() = x(; b^n(); pn(b^n)), for each n = 1; 2; : : :,
and x^() = x(; b^(); p^). Then, the subsequence fx^hkn ()g of the sequence
fx^n()g converges to x^() as the sequence fb^hkn ()g converges to b^() and
the sequence fp^hkn g converges to p^, with p^hkn  0, for each n = 1; 2; : : :,
and p^  0. But then, x^j() = 0 as b^ij() = 0 and x^() 2 X0(; p^)
as x^
hkn () 2 X0(; p^hkn ), for each n = 1; 2; : : :, and the correspondence
X0(; ) is upper hemicontinuous. Therefore, we have that @u (x^())
@xj
= +1
as i; j 2 L stand in the relation C and @u (x^())
@xj
 p^j , by the necessary
conditions of the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. Moreover, there must be a com-
modity h such that x^h() > 0 as u () is strongly monotone, by Assumption
2, and p^w() > 0. Then, @u (x^())
@xh
= p^h, by the necessary conditions of
the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem. But then, @u (x^())
@xh
= +1 as  = +1, contra-
dicting the assumption that u () is continuously dierentiable. Therefore,
if two commodities i; j 2 L stand in the relation C, then ^bij > 0. This
implies that the matrix
^
B is irreducible by our Assumption 4 and by the
argument used by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) in the proof of their The-
orem 2.11 Consider a trader  2 T1. The matrix ^B n b() is irreducible
as
^
bij n b() > 0 for any pair of commodities i; j 2 L which stand in the
relation C, by the previous argument. Consider a trader  2 T0. The ma-
trix
^
B n b() is irreducible as ^B = ^B n b(). Then, the matrix ^B n b(t) is
irreducible, for each t 2 T . But then, from the same argument used by
Busetto et al. (2011) in their existence proof (Cases 1 and 3), it follows that
ut(x(t; b^(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^ n b(t)))), for each b(t) 2 B(t) and for
each t 2 T .12 Hence, b^ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
The role played by Assumption 4 in the proof of Theorem 2 can be further
made clear by using the following example, originally provided by Busetto et
al. (2011). It considers a mixed economy where only Assumptions 1, 2, and
3 are satised, and shows that in this economy a Cournot-Nash equilibrium
11See Codognato and Ghosal (2000), p. 50.
12See Busetto et al. (2011), p. 43.
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may not exist.
Example. Consider the following exchange economy: l = 2, T = T1 [ T0,
where T1 = f2; 3g and T0 = [0; 1], w(2) = (1; 0), w(3) = (0; 1), u2() and
u3() satisfy our Assumption 2, w(t) = (1; 0), for each t 2 [0; 12 ], w(t) =
(0; 1), for each t 2 [12 ; 1], ut() = kx1+x2, for each t 2 [0; 12 ], ut() = x1+kx2,
for each t 2 [12 ; 1], k > 1. This exchange economy does not admit any
Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See the proof of Example 2 in Busetto et al. (2011).
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 are sucient to prove Theorem 1, as shown in
Section 3. They are also sucient to prove the existence of a Walras equi-
librium in atomless exchange economies, as shown by Debreu (1982).13 By
establishing that they are not sucient to show the existence of a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for a mixed version of the Shapley window model, the
example above emphasizes the fact that, in the proof of Theorem 2, conti-
nuity properties of the Walrasian correspondence generated by the atomless
part's behavior must be combined with Assumption 4, which requires that
set of commodities is strongly connected through traders' characteristics, in
order to assure that the aggregate matrix of the bids obtained as the limit
of a sequence of perturbed Cournot-Nash equilibria is irreducible.
5 Discussion of the model
Busetto et al. (2011) showed their existence theorem for the mixed version
of Shapley window model under the assumption that there are at least two
atoms with strictly positive endowments, continuously dierentiable utility
functions, and indierence curves contained in the strict interior of the com-
modity space. Our Theorem 2 provides a dierent existence proof, which
replaces this assumption on atoms' endowments and preferences with other
restrictions, on endowments and preferences of the atomless part, expressed
by the assumption that the set of commodities is strongly connected through
traders' characteristics. The crucial role played in our proof by this assump-
tion has been stressed through the example proposed in the previous section.
The other fundamental element in the proof of this result is represented by
Theorem 1, which holds without any further assumption beyond Assump-
tions 1, 2, and 3. We prove now that this price convergence result can be
13Debreu (1982)'s result is a generalization of the existence theorem of a Walras equi-
librium for exchange economies with a continuum of traders proved by Aumann (1966).
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used to show a further existence theorem for a mixed exchange economy:
Like the existence result in Busetto et al (2011), it imposes that all commodi-
ties are held by at least two atoms and, in the aggregate, by the atomless
sector, but diers from that result since it does not require any further con-
dition on traders' utility functions beyond continuity, strong monotonicity,
quasi-concavity, and measurability.
Let us now replace our Assumption 4 with the following.
Assumption 40. There are at least two traders in T1 for whom w(t) 0.
This assumption is less restrictive than Assumption 4 in Busetto et al.
(2011) as it removes the restriction that the two atoms with strictly posi-
tive endowments also have continuously dierentiable utility functions, and
indierence curves contained in the strict interior of the commodity space.
We now state and prove the new existence theorem.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 40, there exists a Cournot-
Nash equilibrium b^.
Proof. Following Sahi and Yao (1989), we dene the notion of a -positive -
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Let T1  T1 be a set consisting of two traders in
T1 for whom Assumption 4
0 holds. Moreover, let  = mint2 T1f1l minfw1(t);
: : : ;wl(t)gg. We say that the correspondenceB : T ! P(Rl2+) is a -positive
strategy correspondence if B(t) = B(t) \ f(bij) 2 Rl2+ :
P
i 62J
P
j2J(bij +
bji)  ; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg, for each t 2 T1, and if B(t) = B(t), for
each t 2 T n T1. Moreover, we say that a strategy selection b is -positive
if b(t) 2 B(t), for each t 2 T . Finally, we say that an -Cournot-Nash
equilibrium b^ is -positive if b^ is a -positive strategy selection. The
following lemma is a strengthening of Lemma 1.
Lemma 2. For each  > 0, there exists a -positive -Cournot-Nash equi-
librium b^.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 4 in Busetto et al. (2011).
We show now that the sequence of -positive -Cournot-Nash equilib-
ria has a limit and that this limit is a -positive -Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium. Following Busetto et al. (2011), in this part of the proof we apply
again the generalization of the Fatou's lemma in several dimensions pro-
vided by Artstein (1979). Let n =
1
n ; n = 1; 2; : : :. By Lemma 2, for each
n = 1; 2; : : :, there is a -positive -Cournot-Nash equilibrium b^n . The fact
that the sequence f ^Bng belongs to the compact set f(bij) 2 Rl2+ : bij 
13
R
T w
i(t)d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i62J
P
j2J(bij + bji) 
R
T1
 d; for each J 
f1; : : : ; lgg and the sequence fp^ng, where p^n = pn(b^n), belongs to the
unit simplex , for each n = 1; 2; : : :, implies that there is a subsequence
f ^Bkng of the sequence f ^Bng which converges to an element of the set
f(bij) 2 Rl2+ : bij 
R
T w
i(t)d; i; j = 1; : : : ; l;
P
i 62J
P
j2J(bij + bji) R
T1
 d; for each J  f1; : : : ; lgg and a subsequence fp^kng of the sequence
fp^ng which converges to a price vector p^ 2 , with p^  0, by Theorem 1.
Since the sequence fb^kng satises the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein
(1979), there is a function b^ such that b^(t) is a limit point of the sequence
fb^kn (t)g, for each t 2 T , and such that the sequence f ^Bkng converges to
^
B. Moreover, p^ and
^
B satisfy (1), since p^kn and
^
B
kn
kn
satisfy (2), for each
n = 1; 2; : : :, the sequence fp^kng converges to p^, the sequence f ^Bkng con-
verges to
^
B, and the sequence fkng converges to 0. Then, the matrix ^B is
completely reducible, by Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989), as p^  0. But
then,
^
B must be irreducible as b^ is -positive, by Remark 3 in Sahi and Yao
(1989). Moreover, the same remark implies that the matrix
^
B n b(t) is irre-
ducible, whenever it is completely reducible, for each t 2 T1, as there are at
least two traders in T1 for whom w(t)  0, by Assumption 40. Then, from
the same argument used in the proof of Cases 1, 2, and 3 in Busetto et al.
(2011), it follows that ut(x(t; b^(t); p(b^)))  ut(x(t; b(t); p(b^nb(t)))), for each
b(t) 2 B(t) and for each t 2 T . Hence, b^ is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have reconsidered the issues concerning the existence of a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for mixed exchange economies. In particular, we
have shown a general price convergence theorem and an existence theorem
for the mixed version of the Shapley window model which are both based
on the Walrasian properties of atomless part's behavior. Our Theorem 2
provides an existence result which can be applied to economic structures left
uncovered by the existence theorem proved by Busetto et al. (2011): In our
theorem, all traders may indeed have corner endowments, and indierence
curves which touch the boundary of the consumption set. In particular,
it guarantees the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium for the case of
bilateral oligopoly with a competitive fringe for each commodity, thereby
contributing to the growing literature on this type of economic structure,
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initiated by Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) and further analyzed by Bloch
and Ghosal (1997), Bloch and Ferrer (2001), Dickson and Hartley (2008),
Amir and Bloch (2009), among others.
We leave for further research the problem of proving the existence of a
Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a bilateral oligopoly conguration without a
competitive fringe, a case which violates Assumption 1 of Theorem 2. We
have also exhibited the generality of our price convergence theorem, by prov-
ing another existence result, Theorem 3, less requiring than the existence
theorem proved by Busetto et al. (2011), since it assumes that all commodi-
ties are held by at least two atoms and, in the aggregate, by the atomless part
without imposing further assumptions on traders' utility functions beyond
continuity, strong monotonicity, quasi-concavity, and measurability. More-
over, we conjecture that, under the same assumptions, the price convergence
theorem could be used to prove an asymptotic equivalence between Cournot-
Nash and Walras equilibria similar to that obtained by Busetto, Codognato,
and Ghosal (2016): we also leave this proof for future research.
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